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TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ARMY AVIATION IN INTERVENTIONARY OPERATIONS, A.K.A. - LIC, MOOTW, OOTW, AND SASO: ARE WE READY YET?

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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Aviation**



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
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
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Craig H. Bird

Title of Monograph: *Tactical Considerations for Army Aviation
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This monograph argues that an interventionary operation in South or Central America involving a joint task force consisting of at least a U.S. army brigade is likely to occur by 2005. It describes the nature of the military organization necessary to succeed in lesser regional conflict by introducing a realistic, hypothetical scenario. The scenario brings together previously identified problems, and how a Joint Task Force (JTF) built upon an army aviation brigade headquarters can overcome them.

The monograph charges that, although the military community has made doctrinal advances in preparing military units for the MOOTW environment, the job is still incomplete. Some lessons learned from the March 1988 show of force exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT in the Republic of Honduras, and other military operations will point out where there is a need for additional doctrinal guidance.

The significance of MOOTW in Latin America today is greater than ever before. The probability of conducting force projection operations in support of MOOTW is as great as ever. It stands to reason that the capability to operate in this environment is based in large part to the U.S. armed forces doctrine.

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Introduction:

Diplomatic and military interventions in South and Central America have always posed a unique challenge for United States Diplomatic and Military leaders. From the United States military intervention in Panama City in 1858, when Marines and Navy sailors landed to quell large scale riots, until the present, leaders at all levels have searched for a balanced solution to interventionary operations.

Today, the conundrum continues: terminology, roles and missions, plans (or the lack thereof), and other regional commitments compete for limited supporting resources. Professional disunity extends all the way to military terminology used to describe interventionary operations. The most common terms include: Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Operations Other Than War (OOTW), and Stability And Support Operations (SASO).¹ The Department of Defense considers joint operational terms to have precedence over all services, and for that reason the monograph will use the term MOOTW. The semantic problem notwithstanding, one must also conclude that the collective military and government agencies know more about the interventionary environment than ever before. But the question remains, do we understand MOOTW well enough to articulate how we are going to successfully conduct these operations in the near future?

This monograph will argue that an interventionary operation in South or Central America involving a joint task force consisting of at least a U.S. army brigade is likely to occur by 2005. The task force will probably serve with coalition forces in complex

political (that is: strategic), operational, and tactical environments simultaneously. Examining the history of recent military operations in two South and Central American countries will disclose what capabilities this force must have, and under what operational constraints it will operate. Within these environments, the force package of choice will have to possess several versatile capabilities.

The second argument describes the nature of the military organization. The monograph will introduce a realistic, hypothetical scenario to bring together previously identified problems, and how a Joint Task Force (JTF) built upon an army aviation brigade headquarters can overcome them.

The third argument charges that, although the military community has made doctrinal advances in preparing military units for the MOOTW environment, the job is still incomplete. Some lessons learned from the March 1988 show of force exercise Golden Pheasant in the Republic of Honduras, and other military operations will point out where there is a need for additional doctrinal guidance. A look at joint, army, and aviation doctrines will note, not only terminology differences, but more importantly the differences in tactical methodology. Finally, the next step in the preparation process that the army must take is integrating these new doctrinal standards into its tactics, techniques and procedures manuals (TTPs), unit standard operations procedures (SOPs), and unit training plans (UTPs).

Section One: The Political, Strategic Environments

Before one can determine the most appropriate roles and functions of tactical operations in MOOTW, a correlation must link the indigenous country's national character, policies and strategies with those of the United States. Dr. Larry Cable, a professor of history at the University of North Carolina - Wilmington refers to these correlation's as "uniformity," and goes on to establish:

The first uniformity is the primacy of the internal contestants in establishing political goals, definitions of success and failure as well as theories of success or victory. Intervenors must tailor their politico-military goals to those established by the indigenous belligerents or contestants...²

By studying these political goals in an historical context, and recent U.S. military operations in Latin America, one can make an informed assessment regarding the type of operation and force most appropriate in future MOOTW.

This section of the research paper is divided into three parts. Part one looks at two Latin American countries' national character from an historical perspective. Part two examines the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) in Latin America. Part three reviews two recent military operations in Latin America.

Part One:

To understand the possible nature of future military operations in the context of the "mental terrain" of South and Central America, this part will provide a country sketch for two sample countries, the Republics of: Honduras, and Peru. Dr. Cable contends that "the terrain upon which the operation is conducted constitutes not so much the physical geography of the venue as the human topography represented by the minds not only of the

contending entities but of the vast uncommitted population...”³ These sketches are used only to provide a background for understanding the context in which South and Central American countries may perceive the use of U.S. military forces to achieve political goals.

South and Central American politico-military heritage and traditions are very different from the United States’s experience. When U.S. political and military leaders structure a military interventionary response to a crisis, they should consider how these fledgling democracies would interpret that response. The force size and structure must show resolve, and yet not threaten the host country’s prestige or legitimacy.

Many Latin American countries have a long history of military involvement in government affairs. The population is accustomed to having military officers in charge of what we in the United States consider strictly civilian-political business. U.S. military planners must keep this in mind, so as not to reinforce the wrong impression of whom the intervention is trying to support. The implication is that any mission designed to eliminate a threat to a friendly country must also reinforce the idea that military forces, and their generals are subordinate in authority to the civilian government.

A second common trait in the militaries of Latin America, is the idea of human exploitation and unnecessary violence. U.S forces have continued to impress on its southern allies, that a disciplined army has a much greater long term effect on its past, present, and potential enemies than an uncaring, vengeful army. When U.S. military forces enter into a coalition organization, they must be aware that they must set a strong positive example for the other country’s forces.

The political priorities and objectives of Latin American countries are likely to be different than those of the U.S. as well. Many emerging democracies are trying to retain

their political power by: controlling their internal political stability, insuring their external sovereignty, and enhancing their national economic condition. The U.S. leadership may place a higher priority on human rights than most of these countries thereby leaving the indigenous country's goals and objectives as the only common grounds for solidarity. If U.S. leaders and planners do not keep this in mind, they will become frustrated when they try to work with their Latin American military counterparts. More detailed information is contained in Appendix A: Country Briefs.

Part Two: United States, National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy -

A brief examination of the United States security and military strategies for Latin America will provide a basis for understanding how an intervention by U.S. military forces, in conjunction with other elements of national power could best support U.S. political goals. This is important in determining the operational objectives and tactical methods for attaining the end state desired by both the contending countries/belligerents and the United States.

Many aspects of MOOTW are complex and turbulent; changing economies, power struggles, terrorism, illegal drug trade, and different ideologies to name just a few. To minimize the uncertainty to U.S. forces, the National Command Authority formulates and publishes the National Security Strategy (NSS)⁴, National Military Strategy (NMS)⁵ and the United States Defense Strategy.⁶ These documents attempt to focus the policies, efforts and resources of each of the elements of national power. In the 1996 version, President Clinton makes it clear that the South and Central American countries are important to the interests of the U.S. The United States government, does not possess unlimited resources to achieve these interests. As a result, the U.S. military attempts to

achieve economies of manpower, economic, and material resources. The Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, highlights this limitation when he refers to U.S. Army South's (USARSO) mission: "It is a tremendously important region; and with less than 1 percent of the Army committed to making this theater...stable and secure..."⁷ The USARSO commander, Major General Lawson W. Magruder III is even more specific:

U.S. Army South is clearly an economy-of-force operation. Our active-duty ranks include fewer than 3,800 soldiers and about 2,800 civilian employees. In contrast, our area of operation includes 19 nations and a population of 350 million people, and it encompasses a 21 million-square-mile region—almost 22 percent of the earth's land mass.

Interests and resources alone are not an answer to either probability or the nature of involvement the U.S. may face in the near future. Many serious and complex problems are intertwined internationally. The Department of Defense annual report to the President of the United States and Congress 1995 U.S. Defense Strategy recognizes this in its opening remarks: "On the eve of the 21st century, the international environment is more complex and integrated than at any other time in history."⁸ This idea was reinforced during the Summit Implementation Review Group in Kingston, Jamaica, May 15-16, 1996, by the remarks of Ambassador Jane Becker Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, when she stated:

narcotics (are) intertwined with many other summit objectives: judicial reform, economic development, environmental protection, and health care to name a few. If we do not address illegal drugs, we cannot proceed fully on these other important fronts.⁹

Current U.S. national security policy includes threats to the interests of the United States, its allies, and its friends. A transgression upon any one of these interests to the U.S. would likely invite a measured response to overcome the belligerent. The nature of

that transgressor could be national, non-national, or a single criminal. These threats can come from a variety of sources, prominent among these are:

- Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to gain hegemony in their regions through aggression or intimidation.
- Internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives, force mass migration, and undermine stability and international order.
- Threats by potential adversaries to acquire or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.
- Threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
- Subversion and lawlessness that undermine friendly governments.
- Terrorism.
- Threats to U.S. prosperity and economic growth.
- Global environmental degradation.
- The illegal drug trade.
- International crime.¹⁰

A significant interest in the Latin American region is the counter drug effort. Although it is seldom the lead agency, the Department of Defense (DoD) is a key player in combatting illegal narcotics in the U.S. and abroad. It supports the counterdrug mission in five key areas:

- Support to source nations. DoD provides training and other operational support to source-nation counterdrug units to enable them to interdict drug operations, seize deliveries, and arrest traffickers.
- Dismantling cartels. DoD continues to enhance its support for the Drug Enforcement Administration's strategy of dismantling the cocaine cartels and the cocaine business.
- Detection and monitoring the transport of illegal drugs. DoD operates detection and monitoring assets that cover the 2.5 million square mile source and transit zone stretching from South America to U.S. borders.
- Direct support to drug LEAs in the United States. Active, Reserve, and Guard forces provide unique support to domestic drug LEAs in 10 categories -- including transportation, maintenance, training, and intelligence.
- Demand reduction. The Department provides community awareness and community outreach programs, as well as internal drug testing, education and training, and treatment programs.¹¹

Part Three:

Having established the interests and goals of two South and Central American countries, and those of the United States of America, the next step in understanding MOOTW in context is to look at some recent examples of U.S. military operations in the region. These vignettes will also show how important it is to build the force structure on the common interests and goals of the participating countries.

Each of these operations has elements of success and failure. In section three, we will draw some lessons learned from these, and other operations, and compare them with current and emerging joint, army and army aviation doctrine.

Recent history of U.S. involvement in South and Central America -

A Show of Force in the Republic of Honduras - “Exercise Golden Pheasant”

At 1715 hours on March 16, 1988, Honduran president Jose Azcona Hoyo requested “effective and immediate assistance”¹² from the United States. His urgent request came as a result of numerous border incursions by Nicaraguan ground forces onto the Honduran frontier. He voiced a strong concern to U.S. ambassador Everett Briggs that whatever size force the U.S. intervened with, his government must retain the mantle of sovereign legitimacy. The U.S., however must also provide a credible offensive capability to deter Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega from attacking both the Honduran and U.S ground forces directly.¹³

This request set into motion a crises response at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Forces Command (FORSCOM), Military Airlift Command (MAC), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The National Command Authority (NCA) limited the size and level of headquarters out of political considerations.¹⁴ More significantly, they wrestled with, but

could not decide whether the intervention would be a military operation or a training exercise.

The political complexity of the situation demanded the military response to have elements of both peacetime and wartime capabilities. Ultimately the NCA decided to call the intervention an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE).¹⁵ To military planners however, an EDRE only describes how a unit is evaluated during a simulated mobilization, it does not describe the kind of actions forces take once they are in a country.¹⁶ Unfortunately in this kind of mission, ambiguity usually causes misunderstandings resulting in degraded military and political effectiveness.

In addition to political considerations, military capabilities in Honduras and infrastructure limitations played a significant role in determining the type and composition of forces the U.S. military planners decide to use. Existing capabilities in Honduras consisted of a small aviation JTF, an engineer TF with additional aviation assets, Special Operations forces working with the Honduran infantry and artillery combat forces, and additional medical support from a U.S. Air Force mass casualty exercise.¹⁷ Infrastructure limitations included the few poorly maintained roads and railroads, and the limited number of maximum aircraft on the ground (MOG) at destination (Palmerola) airfield.

The JCS determined that the Army would be the lead service to respond, and notified both FORSCOM and SOUTHCOM to begin planning the details of the operation. Most significantly in their instructions they left out a requirement to form a Joint Task Force, leaving that decision to SOUTHCOM.

As SOUTHCOM began planning and coordinating, it asked MAC to send staff planners to the XVIII Airborne Corps, but it stopped short of designating a JTF.¹⁸ This posed

significant command and control problems throughout the planning and execution phases of the intervention. It prevented the establishment of a centralized unity of command, and permitted the Air Force to participate as a semi-autonomous organization. Under these conditions, each headquarters performed their functions as they deemed appropriate, thereby impeding a single coordinated effort.¹⁹

FORSCOM directed the XVIII Airborne Corps to form a Task Force (TF) from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Infantry Division. The 7th division was actually an organic unit of I Corps, but leadership coordination and training standardization quickly aided the melding of the two units into a single force.²⁰ The most significant problem was working out planning details with the U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC).

The MAC was less emphatic about committing most of its assets to the operation/exercise because it had a higher priority standby mission to remain prepared for a Panamanian contingency operation. The 21st Air Force commander, General Merrill McPeak determined the Honduran mission to have a lower priority than other pre-planned competing missions because of its “exercise” status, as implied in the EDRE designation.²¹ This assessment caused two significant differences in how the 21st Air Force prepared for the Honduran mission compared with the XVIII Airborne Corps. First it did not immediately begin to resource aircraft and flight crews, thereby causing a 24 hour delay in uploading soldiers and equipment.²² In fact it was only after Colonel Geoff Hickman, Deputy Director of Operations, 21st Air Force, convinced his commander to begin putting C-141 crews into crew rest did they even begin designating flight crews for the mission.²³ Second, they initially limited Air Crew Loads (ACLs) to peacetime restrictions, while the Army, assuming the mission was an operation, used wartime restrictions. After heated

debate, they compromised, and the Army began the laborious, time consuming task of reconfiguring aircraft loads.²⁴

Lieutenant General John W. Foss, and the XVIII Airborne Corps staff attempted to conduct concurrent planning by making assumptions about the mission details that were not provided by any of the higher headquarters.²⁵ Their assumptions were remarkably valid, except for the type of mission (exercise verses operation) and the type of headquarters they were forming (JTF vs. TF). General Foss decided to form three small headquarters for commanding and controlling army forces in the complex and dynamic environment. One headquarters for handling incoming mission requirements and reports from JCS, SOUTHCOM, and FORSCOM was commanded by the XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Daniel R. Schroeder. The second, subordinate headquarters, from the 82nd Airborne Division, was responsible for the force build-up and logistical support. The tactical headquarters was commanded by Colonel George Crocker, commander of the division's 1st Brigade, and was charged with handling actual tactical missions in country.²⁶

Peru - Military Observer Mission Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP)

After a long standing emotional border dispute with Ecuador, Peru invaded in 1941. After a brief, but intense conflict, Ecuador and Peru signed a peace agreement known as the 1942 Protocol of Rio do Janeiro ('Rio Protocol' for short). Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States signed the Rio Protocol as "guarantors" of the agreement. They assumed the responsibility of stabilizing the military situation in the field so diplomatic measures could work. A second provision of the Rio Protocol established a line of demarcation over rough mountainous terrain that had not been fully surveyed. When a

geological survey team discovered a previously unknown valley in the region, the conditions were set for further dispute. Ecuador began claiming the discovery invalidated the Rio Protocol and began suggesting that they had a legitimate claim to territory in the Amazon basin.²⁷

In December 1994, Ecuador began establishing military base camps in the disputed territory. Peru immediately responded with air and ground attacks, and began a general mobilization for war. Within eight weeks the extremely high casualties, floundering economies, and international diplomatic pressure caused the two countries to seek a peace agreement. Ecuador and Peru signed the Declaration of Itamaraty on March 17, 1995.

Itamaraty paved the way for the guarantors of the Rio Protocol to establish the MOMEPE peacekeeping force. Brazil assumed the military leadership role in the operation, and provided land forces, as did Argentina, and Chile. The U.S. provided an aviation task force, organized with operations, intelligence, communications, and logistical assets capable of supporting the MOMEPE force.²⁸

U.S., Peruvian, and Ecuadorian helicopter forces were instrumental in the success of MOMEPE. They performed reconnaissance missions designed to supervise forces in the area, aerial movements to separate belligerent forces and then move them out of the disputed area, and resupply missions to sustain the MOMEPE ground forces. Helicopter operations were tantamount to success, overcoming restrictive terrain, avoiding land mines (over 6000 by Ecuador alone, many of them in unregistered minefields), and monitoring over 5000 potentially hostile troops scattered over 70 square kilometers of dense jungle vegetation.²⁹

The use of a U.S. army aviation task force with Brazilian, Argentine, and Chilean Infantry forces was a true economy of force mission for the U.S. Its success is a result of matching the correct force structure with the political, military, and geographical conditions in the theater of operations.

Section Two: Road to Conflict

The history of South and Central America in the past 30 years, and the present unstable environment indicate that a regional crises may occur at any time. In "World View 1996" Donald E. Schulz' assessment of Latin America through the year 2006 highlights:

Threats to democratic governments will increase as a result of overpopulation, socio-economic inequalities, poverty, weak economies, an authoritarian political culture, corruption, human rights abuses, and civil-military conflicts. These elements may be exploited by drug cartels, radical politicians from the right and left, unreconstructed Marxists, and the armed forces.³⁰

By tracing the ongoing problems in the Peruvian region, the planned policies set forth in the January 1996 Summit of the Americas, and figuratively charting their possible consequences, one may determine a set of problems that could conceivably occur by the year 2005. These conditions would in all probability cause the U.S. to respond with a number of actions, more or less integrated into an overall diplomatic, economic, military, and coalition plan to correct the problems affecting U.S. national interests.

With the regional characters, interests and policies, and recent MOOTW examples in mind, we can progress to the future using a plausible hypothetical scenario. This scenario, which takes place in Peru will act as a framework for examining whether our emerging doctrine can effectively support MOOTW in the near future. The scenario considers three problems that are of national interest to the United States³¹: a growing illicit drug problem which undermines the health and economies of the South American region and the U.S., a resurgent insurgency and terrorist problem from the Maoist communist faction, Sendero Luminoso, and an international conflict with Ecuador which threatens to upset the stability and development of both countries.³²

Regional conditions -

It is plausible that an economic recession in Peru would lead to increased unemployment, underemployment and uncontrolled inflation. This in turn could cause farmers to significantly increase their coca production as a form of income, and an idle population to create civil unrest. A reorganized Sendero Luminoso (SL) movement would find a more receptive social environment to general labor strikes in their already strongly controlled labor unions. With an increase in funding from the drug trade, and a well established computer internetted command and control system, they could orchestrate highly visible civil protests in the U.S. and the United Kingdom. One of their successful psychological tactics could resemble a story published in 1996, over the world wide web stating: "Under U.S. tutelage, the Peruvian government began organizing paramilitary units called rondas. Peasants are often forced to join these rondas, which are often used as little more than shields for the government's regular troops. When a ronda member is killed, it is reported that "Sendero killed a poor peasant." When peasants refuse to join the rondas, they are executed by the army for being subversives."³³

With Peru focused on internal problems and a weak MOMEPE II observation team, Ecuador would be tempted to pursue its political objective in the Amazon basin by reoccupying the demilitarized zone with military forces.³⁴ They are well equipped and intend to stay until a diplomatic resolution in their favor is achieved.

A U.S. Army War College student, Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Topp, outlined Peru's national priorities under similar conditions in 1992. "Peru's priority interest is to revive its depressed economy. Its second survival interest is to stop the ongoing insurgencies which threaten the state. Stopping illegal narcotic trafficking can be no higher than third

priority...”³⁵ Ecuador’s encroachment into the Amazon basin would not be an immediate threat to national survival. It would bring Peru into the international spotlight, and any military or governmental support directed at reversing Ecuador’s treaty violation, might also improve Peru’s more immediate problems.

After considering these conditions, the president of Peru would likely request the support of the guarantors of the Rio Protocol to immediately respond with a show of force capable of compelling or forcing Ecuador from the Amazon basin. Additionally he would welcome economic, technical, and military assistance in his counter drug, and counter insurgency efforts.

U.S. Response -

The U.S. National Command Authority would have to consider several factors before committing assets to the Republic of Peru. The historical context previously discussed would be compared to the contemporary U.S. national security interests, and popular public sentiments. The NCA would then compare this assessment to other regional security interests and determine what and how many assets to commit to the problems in Peru. More specifically the NCA would turn to the JCS for an assessment on what it could commit from its limited national assets to the South American theater without endangering other, higher priority national security interests.

By 2005, a counter drug effort may be the U.S. priority national security interest in the South and Central American region. Based on current trends, the U.S. will most likely experience tremendous drug abuse problems in the near future, and turn more aggressively to the so called “war on drugs.” General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director Office of National Drug Control Policy made clear what the U.S. interdiction strategy should be in a

statement to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice U.S. House of Representatives October 1, 1996:

Interdiction is a vital complement to a balanced strategy that seeks to: motivate our youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse; to increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; and to reduce the health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drugs. The 1996 Strategy has five goals, two of which focus on interdiction.³⁶

Additionally the idea of cleaning out Peru's coca production would produce other benefits to U.S. national interests. Ambassador Jane Becker articulated this idea to the Summit Implementation Review Group, May 15-16, 1996 "narcotics [are] intertwined with ...judicial reform, economic development, environmental protection, and health care to name a few. If we do not address illegal drugs, we cannot proceed fully on these other important fronts...we must be united in a regional approach."³⁷

The presidents from South and Central America confirmed this in a statement from the Summit of the Americas Fifth Meeting of the Summit Implementation Review Group Santiago, Chile -- January 22, 1996:

The call by our Presidents in Miami for an aggressive attack on the illicit drug trade came at an auspicious time. New survey data and research show that drug abuse is increasing throughout the hemisphere. Sophisticated, violent drug trafficking organizations continue to pursue a strategy of corruption and intimidation to destroy the very government and social institutions needed to underpin democracy and wage effective anti-narcotics campaigns...To get ahead of this threat, it is critical that we accelerate our response by expanding cooperation and strengthening program implementation.³⁸

The U.S. desire to conduct a MOMEPIII operation would be threefold. First the MOMEPIII mission is important to restoring stability in the region and preventing economic disaster. "The United States cannot be prosperous if its major trade and security

partners are threatened by aggression or intimidation; nor can it be secure if international economic cooperation is breaking down, because the health of the U.S. economy is interwoven with the global economy.”³⁹

Second, it is a legitimate way to introduce significant military combat, and combat support forces into the region. These forces, at Peru’s request could conduct counter drug operations once the problems with Ecuador have been corrected. The need to eradicate illegal drugs from both countries was established previously.

The third reason the U.S. would find such a mission in its interests is it enables Peru to conduct more aggressive counter insurgency operations against the Sendero Luminoso with intelligence and advisor support from the U.S. Public opinion and national interests will demand a response to human rights abuses and atrocities that are so common with this organization. The U.S. security strategy by the year 2005 will probably seek for an opportunity to assist Peru in overcoming a situation that resembled Colombia in 1995. “Colombia continued to be wracked by violence in 1995, suffering numerous terrorist bombings, murders, and kidnappings for ransom. Drug traffickers, leftist insurgents, paramilitary squads, and common criminals committed scores of crimes with impunity, killing their targets as well as many innocent bystanders.”⁴⁰

The military organization necessary to operate in all of these environments effectively and efficiently, and at the least cost in terms of U.S. national assets will likely be an army aviation brigade. The coalition forces could readily provide professional infantry and artillery forces. As the original MOMEPE lessons learned clearly indicate that army aviation is instrumental in conducting peacekeeping operations. U.S. helicopters can support government and non-government organizations (NGOs) in conducting counter drug

missions. A JTF based on an aviation brigade is strategically and tactically mobile, requiring approximately 10xC-5A, and 35xC-141 sorties to move into the theater of operations.⁴¹ This is comparable to the 2xC5A and 58xC-141 sorties used for deploying forces during Golden Pheasant.⁴²

Composition of Forces:

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters would likely resemble the 1996 MOMEPE structure. It is led by a Brazilian general officer, who has the title “coordinator” rather than commander to avoid political sensitivities of the nations’ coalition forces.⁴³

To enhance the military capabilities of the operation, United States military forces would need to possess the ability to provide transportation assets, command and control systems, and an operational control cell. Integration through the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) acting as interpreters, liaison officers, and training instructors would be essential to the operation.

Logistics

The most suitable organization to meet these needs would probably consist of an army aviation brigade headquarters, augmented with additional staff members and teams to conduct all the assigned missions. These would include: PSYOP team, SF company, and a civil affairs team. The mission would most certainly require augmentation of the brigade’s operations, intelligence, communications and logistics elements. Aviation unit forces would consist of: an assault helicopter battalion, a medium lift section, an attack helicopter company, an air traffic control (ATC) element, and a maintenance team from the intermediate level maintenance company.

Section Three: The Missions, Purposes and Methods of the U.S. and Coalition Militaries

This section will examine the missions, purposes, and methods of operations in a MOOTW environment. It will then briefly describe lessons learned in past MOOTW interventions and compare them with the solutions prescribed in current and emerging joint, army, and army aviation doctrine as appropriate. It is this tutor of history (and training exercises) that makes a valid assessment of the usefulness and correctness of this, as yet (in the case of emerging doctrine) incompletely tested doctrine. While this will not be a comprehensive examination, it will serve as a good measure of how well doctrine addresses the lessons of history.

The mission of the coalition forces in this scenario would initially consist of conducting a Show of Force operation, followed by a peacekeeping military force observation operation in order to enable diplomatic efforts to take affect between the governments of Ecuador and Peru. Secondly, U.S. forces would conduct reconnaissance, air assault, and security missions to enable DEA and Peruvian enforcement of Counter-Drug Operations. The OOTW Battlefield Development Plan suggests these missions when it says:

The U.S. Army's most likely OOTW mission will be support to counterdrug efforts...U.S. missions will likely continue to focus on destroying drug production facilities and collaboration with Peruvian armed forces to prevent drug trafficking into Colombia. U.S. forces will likely be involved in interdiction efforts that center on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit as well as integrating C3I systems.⁴⁴

Third, U.S. forces would provide intelligence support to the government of Peru for Counter-Insurgencies, and Counter Terrorism. All forces must be prepared at all times to conduct limited attacks in defense of coalition forces, and governmental agencies.

The SOUTHCOM commander's intent of the operation would need to establish the purposes for the missions, the methods for accomplishing the missions, and the end states the missions are designed to produce. In this scenario, the purpose of the operation would likely be to promote regional stability and support the pro-US democracies of Peru and Ecuador. An additional purpose might be to promote stability in all nations comprising the entire Andean region.

The how, or method of operations would be to rapidly build an overwhelming combat capability, secure areas of key terrain through bold, rapid aerial maneuver (securing physical terrain), while avoiding direct hostile confrontation with potential hostile forces and groups (securing mental terrain). Further securing key mental terrain through the use of SOF liaison teams with coalition ground forces to integrate and help control US aviation (lift, reconnaissance, and attack). As U.S. and Peruvian forces have already discovered, this method of security is particularly important in Peru:

In 1990, U.S. forces were stationed in the UHV (Upper Huallaga Valley) to train Peruvian units in counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations...several obstacles (were noted)...Peru was unable to maintain effective control over its military police units involved in counterdrug and counterinsurgency operation in emergency zones. Coordination and cooperation between the military and police was, and probably still is, poor. Government forces consistently failed to control airports in the UHV, and drug traffickers used airports with little or no restraint. Peru's insurgency problem severely hindered counterdrug efforts and eroded government control.⁴⁵

Key end states critical to achieving operational objectives in support future diplomatic measures must include:

1. Cessation of Peruvian - Ecuadorian hostilities
2. Interdict flow of drug lines of communication (LOCs), and destroy the drug transportation and processing infrastructure – this would have the additional

benefit of indirectly enabling other countries in the region to step their counter-drug efforts.

3. Enable Peruvian and U.S. governmental agencies to defeat the counter-insurgent movement.

The conditions occurring within the region would require a three phased plan to successfully bring about the end-states described above. Phase I consists of forming and deploying the JTF. For the United States, each organizational level -- strategic (JCS), strategic/operational (SOUTHCOM), and operational/tactical (JTF) needs to make certain key decisions early in the crises action planning process. These decisions will set the conditions and drive the capabilities and limitations of subordinate command planners during the execution phases. The result being how smoothly and correctly the JTF is able to conduct the MOOTW missions. Phase II is execution of the Show of Force and MOMEPlus missions. Phase III is the continuation phase of MOMEPlus, the counterdrug interdiction, and support to Peru's counter insurgency operations.

The remainder of this section deals with recent lessons learned in different MOOTW environments. The format will describe a recent MOOTW lesson learned, the corresponding joint, army, and army aviation doctrine that applies to the lesson, and then an assessment as to the usefulness and correctness of that doctrine.

Phase I -- forming and deploying the JTF

Lesson learned:

Know and understand strategic goals and objectives guidance, and in the absence of specific guidance make valid assumptions.

A lack of a unifying guidance at the strategic level, leads each service and major command level to different understandings and interpretations as to the mission prioritization,⁴⁶ and which administrative and safety regulations are in effect.⁴⁷ Commanders like General Foss have realized that “planners should not expect precise missions and commander’s intent...(they) must develop implied missions and tasks based on inadequate guidance... (and they must conduct) concurrent planning at the various command levels.”⁴⁸

The U.S. military has long practiced the concept of concurrent mission planning. This process enables commanders at all levels to improve their response time to accomplish missions and tasks, enhance their units’ ability to meet mission requirements, and adapt to any minor changes in those requirements. Additionally, concurrent planning reduces the effects of any major mission changes, because the subordinate commanders are able to anticipate those changes better when they conduct concurrent mission planning.

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, reinforces the idea that one of the essential keys to successful mission accomplishment is the articulation and understanding of a clear and concise mission statement and commander’s intent.

The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows...Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success...The

commander's intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations.⁴⁹

Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, begins to explain the need for strategic and operational level commands to use deliberate contingency plans to help streamline crises action planning. "To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander's strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander's theater objectives."⁵⁰

Joint Pub 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), specifies the Crises Action Planning (CAP) process which JP 5.0 implies. The theme however, continues to focus on clear and concise mission statements, and commanders' intent.

CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to hostilities other than war or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises.⁵¹

FM 100-5 Operations, most clearly describes the environment of crises action planning and force projection by describing the complexity and ambiguity of the social, political, and military environments.⁵² It conforms and develops JP 5-03.1's concept of peacetime contingency planning for preparing for force-projection operations, "The first rule of anticipation is to expect to be alerted and deployed."⁵³

Assessment:

Joint and Army doctrine emphasize the need for understanding the higher commanders' intent in MOOTW. They place a premium on everyone knowing the intent because of the particularly sensitive political nature of the operations, and the potential effect each military member can have on the world and regional perception of the operations. This is a pragmatic understanding of the mental terrain that Larry Cable refers to. Doctrine, however misses the more probable condition that the NCA will not clearly define the political/strategic goals and objectives.

FM 100-5 does begin to address the idea that commanders will have to make their estimates and mission plans on their own assumptions.

Force-projection operations follow a general sequence, although the stages often overlap in space and time. These operations seldom begin with a clear idea of the entire package or purpose. Often, deployment requirements develop by bits and pieces, with a few false starts and subsequent large adjustments.⁵⁴

It follows that these missions and methods will have to be planned using assumptions gleaned by senior level commanders, then communicating those to the different commands and staffs for concurrent planning.

Lesson Learned:

"The experience of Golden Pheasant suggests that we should review peacetime requirements now to identify those that can be waived, simplified, or done in summarized fashion under similar crises circumstances."⁵⁵

Problems during Golden Pheasant regarding ACLs have already been covered. The USAF and Army planners also clashed on the loading and transportation of ammunition. The Air Force load masters did not want to "combat load" ammunition on the aircraft. They had not received approval to do so, and insisted on using a separate "hot-spot" for

loading crated, class ‘A’ ammunition (missiles, rockets, and artillery rounds).⁵⁶ This procedure required additional time for conducting planeload inventories, labeling and tagging hazardous cargo crates, then later breaking down and redistributing ammunition to units and soldiers once they had landed in the area of operations. The public affairs officer for the 82nd Airborne, Major Mike Nason noted the impact of all this, “was that the first wave of paratroopers was not allowed to parachute into Honduras.”⁵⁷

The Army has had its own regulatory problems in MOOTW: approval for the use of Extended Range Fuel Systems (ERFS) in a hostile environment, waivers for not using seatbelts in UH-60s and ACLs for Ch-47s, UH-60s and UH-1s in the show of force ‘exercise.’⁵⁸

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, recognizes that “The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy.”⁵⁹ It further states that “a lodgment phase allows the movement and build up of a decisive combat force in the operational area.”⁶⁰ and that “Logistics is crucial to (tactical and operations) phasing.”⁶¹ JP 3-0 conveys the fundamental idea that in all operations “JFCs influence the outcome of campaigns and major operation by...assessing risks to be taken.”⁶² “Risk is inherent in all military operations.”⁶³

Joint Pub 4-01 Mobility System Policies Procedures and Considerations, recognizes three procedural areas for movement requirements’ consideration: Peacetime Movement Requirements, JCS-Directed and JCS-Coordinated Exercises, and Wartime Movement Requirements.⁶⁴ “The Joint Chiefs of Staff require annual submission and updating of all

exercise proposals by commanders of unified and specified commands for the next \$ fiscal years.”⁶⁵

The wartime movement requirements come closest to the deployment lift process of force projection and contingency operations for MOOTW. The special assignment airlift mission (SAAM), is a lengthy airlift requisition process that is most appropriate for use in the relatively predictable military deliberate planning process. For clarity and brevity a condensed explanation follows:

Special Assignment Airlift Missions During a Crisis...Airlift to support the crisis, deployment flow, the JOA, and other theaters will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Transportation Board (JTB)...While the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JTB) may allocate airlift in the warning or alert orders, the use of the allocations does not take effect until OPORD execution is directed... During a developing crisis... Service airlift validating agencies will transmit SAAM requests directly to the supported CINC's designated agent for airlift requirements... Validating agencies will submit SAAM requirements in accordance with the DOD Common-user Airlift Transportation Directives... After receipt of the warning order or alert order, the supported CINC will inform JDA of validated SAAM requests by submitting an OPREP-1 in accordance with JOPS, Volume IV.⁶⁶

As the experiences of Golden Pheasant point out, the time it takes to complete this process is too lengthy to adequately respond to short notice contingencies.

FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training, convincingly argues that, “Units should train in peacetime as they will fight during war. Peacetime training must replicate battlefield conditions. All training is based on this principle. Leaders must ensure that soldiers are trained to cope with complex, stressful and lethal situations they will encounter in combat.”⁶⁷ It balances the idea of risk with safety when it adds that, “The goal of the chain of command is not training first not safety first, but training safely.”⁶⁸

Assessment:

It is astonishing that on the subject of preparing to rapidly transport forces into an area of operations our doctrine is almost completely silent. Most of the above references to risk are in the context of where and when to employ those forces. The references to logistics are in the context of anticipating requirements and contingency plans. These are important principles, but they leave leaders of short notice force projection operations in a virtual vacuum when it comes to the actual transportation of combat and combat support forces. I have asserted that a deliberate risk assessment should be anticipated during the rapid movement of forces into the theater of operations.

Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) manuals JP 3-07.3 Peacekeeping Operations⁶⁹ and JP 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations, do not even mention MOOTW, nor any measures for getting forces into the area of operations. JP 4-01 Mobility Systems, Policies, Procedures, and Considerations addresses resource prioritization and allocation, and SAAMs request procedures in peacetime and war. While JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, once again does not recognize MOOTW. This doctrinal void leaves writers of technical publications without guidance, and commanders without authority to remedy the problems associated with rapidly deploying a force into a potentially hazardous, and politically sensitive environment.

According to Joint Pub 1-01.1 Compendium of Joint Operations, Joint Pub No. 4-01.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations (currently in draft) may address the unique requirements for MOOTW: “The publication will also discuss requests for, apportionment of, and allocation of airlift support in both deliberate and crisis action processes, in addition to the airlift mission’s relationship with

potential air and ground support and procedures associated with the transfer of theater airlift assets.”⁷⁰

Lesson Learned:

Form a JTF around an existing command and control headquarters.

During exercise Golden Pheasant, FORSCOM formed an Army task force (TF) from the first infantry brigade headquarters of the 82nd Airborne Division. Two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, an air cavalry troop, and a section of tanks also from the 82nd Division were task organized with two infantry battalions from the 7th Infantry division. These units worked well together under one commander. Significant problems did arise however, when both the JCS and SOUTHCOM failed to issue orders designating this task force (TF) as a joint task force (JTF).⁷¹ The most difficult problems in the operation arose because even with the best of intentions by officers in all services, it was impossible in to synchronize the operation without a single unified commander. As a result, complications developed between army strategic airlift requirements and the air force military airlift command.⁷² The processing of air requests, determination of allowable cabin loads (ACLs, the total weight that an aircraft is authorized to carry), and how to transport class “A” type munitions were just a few of the problems that arose from the disunity of command inherent in not designating a single operational field headquarters.

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 3-0 - Doctrine for Joint Operations recognizes the importance of centralized command and control...”The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations...Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations.” It also describes the

purpose of JTFs, “JTF operations are normally operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives.”

Field Manual 100-5 Operations, recognizes the other organizations in MOOTW and that the army “...conducts such operations as part of a joint team and often in conjunction with other U.S. and foreign government agencies.”⁷³ FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations highlights the need to modify command relationships, particularly “...the need for unity of action with civilian agencies of the U.S. and other participating governments and private organizations.”⁷⁴

Assessment:

Both of the doctrinal manuals are descriptive of the MOOTW (SASO in the army’s new terminology) environment. They do not provide specific guidance to indicate under what conditions one should form a JTF, nor do they describe how to integrate the staffs and forces of that new task organization. It is the relative confusion and purpose of operations such as Golden Pheasant that stress the need to describe the conditions which would lead to forming a JTF.

In spite of this, the number of JTFs formed since Golden Pheasant indicates that the military’s senior leadership has changed the way it forms the operational headquarters during crises action planning. Examples such as operations: Ghost Zone, GTMO, JTF 1-120, and Restore Democracy indicate how the acceptance of establishing JTFs without specific doctrinal guidance may have already been achieved. Perhaps the next generation of joint publications will reflect this reality.

Phase II. Transition to Show of Force, and MOMEP Plus missions

Lesson learned:

Integrate U.S. forces with multinational forces early in the planning and execution phases.

The United States ambassador to Honduras, Everett Briggs was instrumental in assisting in the integration of the Honduran general staff and its military with US forces on March 17, 1988. He further addressed potential problems needing NCA involvement to the assistant secretary of state Elliott Abrams for quick resolution. This was much quicker than the attempts made by General Schroeder through the military chain of command.⁷⁵

Former SOUTHCOM commander, General Barry R. McCaffrey is experienced in coalition efforts in Latin America. He reveals some compelling reasons for deliberately planning for coalition efforts in an MOOTW environment, “The tactical success of interdiction efforts inspired by SOUTHCOM - which amount to less than 1 percent of the U.S. counterdrug budget - suggest that unity of effort can bring greater success. This menace demands international will, cooperation, and sustained operations.”⁷⁶

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 3-0 devotes an entire chapter to multinational operations. It has the vision to describe how US armed forces may become involved in multinational operations under “other - than - US leadership.”⁷⁷ It goes further in prescribing to planners the need to “determine where the integration of (multinational) units is to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment.”⁷⁸

Joint Pub 3-07 contains a section on multinational operations within chapter IV “Planning for Military Operations Other Than War.” In terms of integrating alliance or

coalition forces it defers to JP 3-0, and to JP 3-16 “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations” which is still unpublished.

FM 100-5 says very little about multinational operations, and calls them “coalition operations”⁷⁹ instead using of the joint term.

FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations, has the most comprehensive concept of integrating multinational forces. It also describes inclusion of government and non-government agencies into a comprehensive operation.

The US Army may operate with other US and foreign militaries; civilian agencies of state, federal, and foreign governments; and nongovernment organizations. To be effective, the efforts of all these organizations have to be integrated into one coordinated operation. The senior Army commander must devote much of his time and energy to the problems of coordination and cooperation.⁸⁰

FM 100-23 Peace Operations, contains a short section of Multinational Operations, however it only describes the political advantages and command and control challenges of multinational operations.⁸¹

Assessment:

Joint and Army doctrines have a solid understanding of multinational cooperation and coordination. They recognize that the nature of this integration is challenging, but necessary for conducting successful MOOTW. A greater emphasis could be placed on early integration of multinational forces through use of SOF, liaison officers, and the Ambassador’s country team. MOOTW doctrine places a significant emphasis on the use of liaison officers to incorporate the desired integration of multinational forces, government and non-government agencies. This will be discussed later in the paper.

Lesson Learned:

Deploy an overwhelming, credible combat force.

To deter aggression of potential enemies in a MOOTW environment, the U.S.- coalition forces need to display their combat power. Airborne, armor and aviation maneuver forces usually have the most significant impact on potential enemies. The Undersecretary of the Army, the Honorable Joe Reeder writes:

Army aviators are one of the big reasons why we are, as Dr. Perry puts it, the meanest dog in the neighborhood. What U.S. Army Aviation brings to the table cannot be matched by any other army in the world...The 3/58th ATS (Air Traffic Control) battalion...was the first aviation unit on the ground in Tuzla. Without them our Air Force would have been grounded...In front of our armored forces the entire way from Hungry, through Croatia and into Bosnia were 1st Armored Division Apaches, providing cover and protection. But more importantly, these Apaches sent a strong message to the world that the U.S. Army was going in strong.⁸²

Armed forces landing in the potentially hostile Honduran - Nicaraguan environment had an immediate positive psychological impact of on the media, United States and Honduran populations, and the government of Nicaragua. Media sources indicate that the three most convincing elements of the exercise that made the United States show of force credible were: attack helicopters, tanks, and the airborne operation. The end result was the withdrawal of Nicaraguan forces from Honduras.⁸³

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, focuses on the conventional end of the spectrum of warfare, and of joint and multinational responses to conventional military threats to the National Security Strategy. Within this context, the idea of using overwhelming force is comprehensive in its approach, but for the purpose of MOOTW it may be inappropriate.

Concentration of military power is a fundamental consideration. We should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but on the quality of their planning and skillfulness of their employment. Properly trained and motivated forces with superior technology, executing innovative, flexible, and well-coordinated plans, provide a decisive qualitative edge. Careful selection of strategic and operational priorities aids concentration at the decisive point and time.⁸⁴

Dr. John T. Fishel, is a professor in the Department of Joint and Combined Operations (DJCO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He points out in his report, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama that the principle of mass in a MOOTW environment means more than the application of combat power in the conventional sense, it also includes massing other types of resources.

With the anticipated destruction of the PDF this lack of forces in the city center would leave a law and order vacuum. Such a vacuum would clearly result in a high potential for looting, vigilantism, and common criminal activity unless there were plans to provide U.S. forces to replace the disintegrated PDF...In the rush to build a plan for taking down the PDF which took advantage of the night and achieved tactical surprise, hardly anyone anticipated the impact that these changes would have on the civil-military situation in Panama City. Added to this was the propensity of the XVIII Airborne Corps to see its military role in terms that could be described as breaking things while leaving it to somebody else to put them back together.⁸⁵

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides a balanced approach to the use of overwhelming force.

Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment.⁸⁶

FM 100-5 is congruent with the joint publications, yet clearer regarding force projection operations in MOOTW. "An important strategic consideration for planning...is

to introduce, credible, lethal forces early...the rapid insertion of highly lethal forces can convince a potential adversary that further aggression is too costly...”⁸⁷

It provides additional guidance to commanders regarding the nature of their planning and execution with the profound and somewhat novel idea that the planning and information environment is chaotic. This concept sets this manual apart and based on the lessons learned in previous operations, should be developed further in other doctrinal manuals.

Early critical decisions, set against a back-drop of uncertainty and friction, will be required at every level—strategic, operational, and tactical—in war and in operations other than war. The commander and the force will routinely be required to plan and execute multiple concurrent activities. Decisions made early will begin to set conditions for successful mission accomplishment.⁸⁸

FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations states, “The peace enforcement organization must generate enough visible combat power that the belligerents recognize the futility of opposition.”⁸⁹ It does not describe how to accomplish this, except to restrain the actual use of force through rules of engagement (ROE), minimization of collateral damage, shows of force, and demonstrations.⁹⁰

Assessment:

Deploying overwhelming combat power appears to be one of doctrines’ strong suits. The caveat of FM 100-5 is that uncertainty and friction make planning and executing force projection operations complex and chaotic. The lessons of projecting overwhelming power in the spectrum of MOOTW suggest that doctrine should address how commanders and staffs should, or could expect to operate without a clear intelligence picture, or specific operational guidance.

Phase III MOMEPlus Continuation Phase, Counterdrug Effort, and Support to
Government of Peru Counter Insurgency Operations

Lesson learned:

Use Special Operations Forces to perform liaison functions with multinational partners to effect unity of effort.

During Golden Pheasant, "...cooperation between the two armed forces was assured in large measure by a single unit, Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group."⁹¹ A major reason for this success was that, "these Special Forces soldiers had knowledge of the situation and language, established credibility with Honduran commanders, and communications links over a wide part of the country."⁹²

In his 1990 article, "Introduction to Low Intensity Conflict," Major David J. Schroer highlights the benefits of integrating SOF into MOOTW.

SOF units are area oriented and often conduct recurring missions into the same area of operations. They can provide a great deal of information to conventional units and can often conduct mutually beneficial operations. Their language training and knowledge of local customs can be invaluable in establishing contact and maintaining rapport with government forces or the local population.⁹³

In an environment as emotionally charged as MOOTW, it makes sense to integrate units with professional soldiers already trained and knowledgeable of the area of operations (AO) into the concept of the operation. Their situational awareness of potential problems will aid commanders at all levels in avoiding and/or solving problems stemming from human nature. Major Schroer identifies three lessons that should be included on every commanders' checklist for MOOTW planning:

1. Establish contact with the SOF unit responsible for the area of operations.

2. Coordinate for mutual support operations.
3. Request area orientation training by SOF.⁹⁴

Doctrine:

Joint Pub 1 makes one reference (in the context of Desert Shield/Storm) to the use of SOF for liaison with multinational forces, “The USCENTCOM special operations command had numerous liaison teams with coalition military forces, which played major roles in coordinating fire support and other aspects of military operations.”⁹⁵

JP 3-0 has a lot more to say about the utility and even necessity of liaison officers and teams.⁹⁶ It prescribes the requirements for linguists, communications equipment, understanding cultural concepts, and communicating warfighting concepts.⁹⁷ It continues to prescribe the necessity for commanders’ to exchange liaison teams with coalition forces early in the planning process.⁹⁸ In fact there is so much talk about the need for robust liaison, one would think the US armed forces have a fully fielded special liaison service.

Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition’s concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.⁹⁹

What JP 3-0 does not identify are the unique abilities of SOF to perform many of these functions. Special forces are not the only units capable of multinational liaison, but as we have seen in the previous examples, they should be identified by the capstone operational doctrine as a potential source.

Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, begins to fill the void left by JP3-0 by specifying the capabilities of SOF to conduct liaison between conventional US forces and coalition forces, “SOF may be required to execute unilateral operations or apply their unique characteristics to provide liaison to coalition partners and, by so doing, facilitate interoperability between US and allied forces.”¹⁰⁰

Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War addresses the lessons of using SOF as liaison more directly than the other doctrinal manuals. It includes the use of Civil Affairs (CA) in liaison duties in unique and effective ways, “Civil affairs may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various outside groups.”¹⁰¹

The description for the use of SOF is also appropriate for the lessons learned in past operations,

SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross-cultural training, their regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational operations objectives.¹⁰²

FM 100-5 Operations, postulates that, “Robust liaison will facilitate understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.”¹⁰³ It is generally compatible with the joint pubs, but does omit specifying the use of SOF for liaison,

Assets that can facilitate a smooth transition to combined operations may already be in the theater. Among these could be the US ambassador and his country team, US foreign-area officers stationed in country, and US civilian contractors who may know the area well and are proficient in the local language.¹⁰⁴

The U.S. Army's Operations manual accurately describes multinational operations and the requirement for competent liaison officers. Surprisingly they once again omit the capabilities of Special Forces.

Few linguists have both the technical expertise and depth of understanding to cross both language and doctrinal boundaries and be fully understood. Loss of meaning in translation can be high. The problems that can arise due to miscommunication are potentially disastrous. A possible solution is a significant resource commitment to dedicated liaison and linguist teams...¹⁰⁵ Whenever possible, such liaison or coalition staff personnel should be familiar with the staff and operational organizations, doctrine, and procedures of the force with which they will work. They should either speak the language of that force or be accompanied by interpreters. Also, civil affairs staff officers can assist in the control of operations that require the cooperation of host nation civilian authorities.¹⁰⁶

FM 100-15 Corps Operations, misses the lessons of liaison completely. After acknowledging, "Liaison with joint, multinational, or government and nongovernment agencies are critically important to OOTW mission success."¹⁰⁷ and the "need to make extraordinary efforts to exchange liaison at all echelons...," FM 100-15 fails to make the connection for using SF or CA for multinational liaison, "SOF assets perform special reconnaissance, direct action, or other special operations."¹⁰⁸ Chapter 2 devotes just over four pages to SF and CA, without once mentioning their capabilities to perform liaison functions.

Assessment:

While the subordinate joint doctrinal publications provide an excellent description of the liaison capabilities of SOF, the cornerstone manuals do not. In terms of staff planning and execution, this may not present significant problems, however, they may at the senior leadership level. Senior leaders may not grasp the

austere U.S. forces liaison capability and the need to integrate SOF as a key liaison asset.

The recognition for the use of SF and CA that the Joint Pubs begin to establish lose emphasis in FM 100-5, and then breaks down completely in FM 100-15. A key use for doctrinal manuals is in providing enough guidance, either through description or description of the MOOTW environment from which commanders, and their staffs can develop the methods for how to conduct operations and successfully meet the operational and strategic endstates. For this lesson learned, the Army publications are unacceptable.

Conclusions

The significance of MOOTW in Latin America today is greater than ever before. The probability of conducting force projection operations in support of MOOTW is as great as ever. It stands to reason that the capability to operate in this environment is based in large part to the U.S. armed forces doctrine.

Drawing from National Strategic and Military Strategies, a cursory understanding of the Latin American environment, and recent military operations there, this paper has discussed current doctrine by contrasting it to lessons learned in that environment. In general the doctrine has accurately described force projection operations in the MOOTW environment. In some cases it prescribes solutions and techniques to overcome common planning and execution obstacles.

Briefly some of the shortcomings of doctrine are:

1. The NCA will probably not clearly define the political/strategic goals and objectives at the beginning of planning for force projection operations, hence senior commanders will need to make and disseminate key assumptions to begin concurrent planning.
2. Doctrine is unprepared to adapt methods and procedures to rapidly transport forces into an area of operations.
3. Doctrine does not provide guidance to indicate under what conditions one should form a JTF, nor does it describe how to integrate the staffs and forces of that new task organization. The developing tradition of forming JTFs whenever possible may not always provide the framework for establishing the most appropriate headquarters.

4. Deploying overwhelming combat power appears to be one of doctrines' strong suits. The caveat of FM 100-5 is that uncertainty and friction make planning and executing force projection operations complex and chaotic.

Appendix A: Country Briefs

PERU –

Peru has a long history of military influence. Peru proclaimed its independence in 1821, primarily through the foreign leadership of Jose de San Martin (Argentina) and Simon Bolivar (Columbia). Independence was assured by the defeat (1824) of Spain at the battles of Junin and Ayacucho. Peruvian society remained sharply divided however between the wealthy Creole oligarchy, and the poverty-ridden indigenous majority. Political life alternated between revolts and dictatorships, the first civilian government was elected in 1872, but a war with Chile in 1879 proved disastrous. It led to the loss of valuable nitrate fields along its southern border and the prolonged Tachna-Arica dispute with Chile. Finally from 1908-12 Augusto B. Leguia served as civilian president. He was brought back to power by a military coup in 1919 and became a virtual dictator who dominated the country, promoting economic development in the interest of the wealthy minority. In 1924 a radical reform party (APRA) was founded and dedicated to improving the conditions of the indigenous peoples. It continued to gain support, and in 1945 Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivera was elected president on an APRA ticket, although he was not a member of the party. In 1948 he was disposed by a military junta. It wasn't until 1963 that Fernando Belaunde Terry, a moderate reformer, won a presidential election, but he was deposed in 1968 by another military junta which assumed dictatorial powers, instituted a program of social reform, and seized U.S. owned companies. The junta ruled until 1975 when President Velasco was "retired" by his own prime minister, General F Morales B...

Constitutional government resumed in July 1980 with the return of Belaunde to the presidency. He was succeeded by Aprista, Alan Garcia Perez in 1985. The 1980s was a

decade of economic collapse, with inflation nearly 8000% in 1990. The communist insurgent organization, Sendero Luminoso (SL) became increasingly powerful in rural and urban areas, and fighting continued into the 1990s. Alberto K. Fujimori was elected president in 1990. His policies reduced inflation and moved to free the economy from government control, but Peru's economic recession deepened. In 1992 Fujimori suspended the constitution, saying emergency action was needed to fight the guerrillas, drug traffickers, and corruption. Later that same year he won a majority in legislative elections that were boycotted by major opposition parties. Peru began to privatize most state-owned businesses in 1993, and voters narrowly approved a new constitution the same year; by 1994 the economy had improved significantly.

HONDURAS

After its independence from Spain in 1821 and Mexico in 1823, Honduras joined the United Provinces of Central America. In 1840, it declared its independence; however stronger neighbors, especially Guatemala exercised great influence in Honduran politics throughout the 19th century. Honduras is only now escaping the cycle of frequent disruptive changes in national government. Since 1821 the country has averaged almost one presidential change per year, and the United States has often been criticized for interfering in its political affairs.

U.S. mining companies played a major role in late 19th-century Honduran economic growth, but it remained the least developed state in Central America. In the 20th century U.S. fruit companies—United, Standard, and Cuyamel—rapidly made bananas the principal export of the country. They competed ruthlessly for favorable concessions from the liberal governments. The fruit companies gave Honduras a major export commodity, developed its Caribbean ports, and contributed, indirectly, to the growth of San Pedro Sula. Most of Honduras, however remained backward, illiterate, and under populated.

Since the 1870s, the Honduran army has played a dominant role in the selection of civilian leadership. Tensions resulting from the large-scale emigration of Salvadorans into Honduras led to a brief border war (July 1969). The relative political instability of its neighboring countries continued to be a central problem for Honduras in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Finally, in 1980 General Paz signed a peace treaty with El Salvador, and there was progress toward constitutional government. In the early 1980s,

the armed forces began to transition control of the government to civilian control, but retained considerable influence.

Honduran political stability was a critical factor in the completion of such development projects as the El Cajon hydroelectric dam in central Honduras, the opening of new agricultural lands in the lower Aguan Valley, a land entitlement program under the agrarian reform agency, a road-building program, and the construction of schoolhouses in almost all rural communities.

In March 1988 the United States sent 3,200 troops to Honduras after it was reported that Nicaraguan forces had crossed into Honduras. The American troops held training exercises but saw no military action. In presidential elections held in November 1989, Rafael Leonardo Callejas of the National party defeated the ruling Liberal party's candidate; he took office on Jan. 27, 1990.

From 1982 Nicaraguan rebels opposed to the Sandinista government of Nicaragua had used Honduras as a sanctuary. The victory of the opposition in Nicaragua's 1990 elections eased the way for the dismantling of the rebel bases in Honduras.

Approximately 93 percent of the population in Honduras can be classified as Latinos or mestizos. Another 5 percent come from six different native Indian groups. While many remnants of the native cultures still exist, very few Honduran Indians retain their original languages. Afro- and Anglo-Antilleans who migrated to Honduras more than 100 years ago from Caribbean islands occupy the north coast and the Bay Islands. Very small groups of German and Middle Eastern ancestry are also prominent in the business activities of the north coast.

¹ The Joint Staff doctrinal manuals call interventionary operations: Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 Chp. V, pg. VI; in the past, the U.S. Army has called it Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Field Manual (FM) 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and presently calls it Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, in the near future the army may call it Stability and Support Operations (SASO) Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, Final Draft, April 1996; The U.S. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1992, and the Marines FMFM 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989, pg. 21, use the term LIC

² Larry Cable "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," Small Wars & Insurgencies (volume 7, Spring 1996, number 1): 98

³ Ibid.

⁴ The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1996)

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995)

⁶ Annual Report to the President and the Congress Part 1, U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, Chapter 1 [on line]; available from http://www.dtic.dla.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_1.html Internet, assessed December 5, 1996.

⁷ Lawson W. Magruder III, Major General, as quoted in "U.S. Army South: Fostering Peace in Central and South America," ARMY 1996-97 Green Book, Association of the United States Army, (1996, Volume 46, no. 10): 181

⁸ Annual Report to the President and the Congress Part 1. Note: The Annual Report to the President and the Congress, commonly referred to as the Annual Defense Report, details how the Department of Defense built its capabilities and is working to maintain them in the future. In addition to fulfilling a statutory requirement, specifically U.S.C. Title 10, the Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Report is widely distributed and serves as a basic reference document for those interested in national defense issues and programs. So that it may be presented in an open forum, this report is unclassified.

⁹ Statement by: Jane Becker, Ambassador and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to the Summit Implementation Review Group in Kingston, Jamaica, May 15-16, 1996 [on line]; available from <http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/960515a.htm>, accessed November 21, 1996.

¹⁰ U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, Chapter 1

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Major Jonathan M. House, "The Army in a Show of Force, March, 1988" Historical Analysis Series, Military Studies Branch - U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington D.C., (November 1, 1989): 154

¹³ Julia Preston, "Reagan Orders Troops to Honduras," The Washington Times (March 17, 1988): A1

¹⁴ House, 54

¹⁵ Ibid., 159

¹⁶ Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990) Glossary - 3. NOTE: It is interesting that the term EDRE does not appear in the doctrines of Joint publications, or Army field manuals, except for this army field *training* manual.

¹⁷ House, 83, 116

¹⁸ Ibid., 56

¹⁹ Ibid., 49, 50, 57, and 75

²⁰ Ibid., 58, 61

²¹ Ibid., 49-50

²² Ibid., 50-51

²³ Ibid., 51

²⁴ Ibid., 68, 75

²⁵ Ibid., 54

²⁶ Ibid., 142

²⁷ Government of Peru, "The Protocol of Peace, Friendship And Boundaries," Basic Documents of the Protocol of Rio De Janeiro of 1942, [on line]; available at, <http://www.rree.gob.pe/rree-i/peru-ecu/ind-eng.htm>

²⁸ Glenn R. Weidner, "Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crises," Joint Force Quarterly 11(Spring 1996): 54.

²⁹ Ibid., 53.

³⁰ Donald E. Schulz, "World View 1996 Part V Latin America" - (February 1, 1996) [database on line] , <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/vsassi/ssipubs/pubs96/wdvvu/wdvvu96p6.htm>, accessed December 5, 1996

³¹ NSS February 1996

³² A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 15-17

³³ from The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, "CSRP: Crimes of the US-Backed Fujimori Regime", November 1996 [database on line], <http://www.calyx.com/~peruweb/csrp.htm>, accessed December 10, 1996

³⁴ CPT Steve Hiller, "Military Observer Mission-Ecuador and Peru (Military Observer Mission - Ecuador And Peru (MOMEP) and JTF Safe Border" Collection Division, CALL, Ft. Leavenworth KS., [on line]; available from http://call.army.mil:1100/call/nftf/jan_feb.96/chpt6.htm; accessed November 21, 1996. Note: The bulk of support is provided by 1-228AVN, based at FT Kobe, Panama, which provides the UH-60 support to MOMEP.

³⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Topp, The United Stated Counter Drug Strategy for Peru (USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 7, NTIS, AD-A251 262.

³⁶ Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director Office of National Drug Control Policy to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 1996 [on line]; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/index.html>; Internet, assessed November 21, 1996.

³⁷ Remarks By: Ambassador Jane Becker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Government of the United States Summit Implementation Review Group, Kingston, Jamaica, May 15-16, 1996 [online]; <http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/960515a.htm>, accessed November 21, 1996.

³⁸ The presidents from South and Central America in a statement from the Summit of the Americas Fifth Meeting of the Summit Implementation Review Group Santiago, Chile -- January 22, 1996, [on line]; <http://americas.fiu.edu/documents/960122i.htm>, accessed November 21, 1996.

³⁹ U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, Chapter 1, pg. 2

⁴⁰ Office of the Secretary, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Philip C. Wilcox, Jr; Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995: Latin America Overview U.S. Department Of State 1996 April: [on line]; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/index.html>, assessed November 21, 1996.

⁴¹ Note: information based on validated load plans as indicated in the 18th Aviation Brigade Readiness Standard Operating Procedures manual, June 1994. Aviation assets would include 6xAH-64A Apaches, 4xVH-47D Chinooks, 30xUH-60 Blackhawks, and all support personnel, equipment and logistics necessary for operating in a field environment for 2 weeks before any resupplies would be necessary.

⁴² House, 154

⁴³ Glenn R. Weidner, "Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crises," Joint Force Quarterly 11(Spring 1996): 54.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, Operations Other Than War Battlefield Development Plan, Department of the Army Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center: June, 1995; 3-57

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3-10

⁴⁶ House, 49,50

⁴⁷ Ibid., for USAF aircraft loading and authorized aircraft load (ACL) limits: 68; for tactically loading ammunition: 74, 75

⁴⁸ Ibid., 157

⁴⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Army: US Army AG Publication Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2898), February 1995, III-24

⁵⁰ Ibid., II-15

⁵¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures) August 1993, V-1

⁵² Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Headquarters Department of the Army, Headquarters TRADOC); June 1993, 3-3

⁵³ Ibid., 3-3

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3-7

⁵⁵ House, 162

⁵⁶ Ibid., 74

⁵⁷ Molly Moore, and John M. Goshko, (Washington Post), March 19, 1988 A18

⁵⁸ Ibid., 86

⁵⁹ Joint Pub 3-0, III-9

⁶⁰ Ibid., III-18

⁶¹ Ibid., III-20

⁶² Joint Pub 3-0, II-16

⁶³ Ibid., III-28

⁶⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-01 Mobility System Policies Procedures and Considerations (Army: US Army AG Publication Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2898) Change 2, September 1986, IV-3 and 5

⁶⁵ Ibid., IV-3

⁶⁶ Ibid., IV-9, 10, 11

⁶⁷ U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 25-101 Battle Focused Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-4

⁶⁸ Ibid., 1-5

⁶⁹ JCS, JP 3-07.3 Peacekeeping Operations (Washington, JCS, 1995)

⁷⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01.1 Compendium of Joint Publications (Army: US Army AG Publication Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2898) April 1995, IV-2

⁷¹ House, 49

⁷² Ibid., 62

⁷³ Fm 100-5, 13-1

⁷⁴ Department of the Army, FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations, (Final Draft, Headquarters TRADOC) April 1996, II-5

⁷⁵ House, 84

⁷⁶ GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, "A Former CINC Looks at Latin America" Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 96/No. 11): 47

⁷⁷ JCS, Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Army: US Army AG Publication Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2898); February, 1995 VI-1

⁷⁸ Ibid., VI-12

⁷⁹ FM 100-5 Operations, 3-6

⁸⁰ FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations, 2-5

⁸¹ Department of the Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, (Headquarters Washington, DC, December 1994): 21-23

⁸² Honorable Joe Reeder, "U.S. Army Aviation: Unmatched," Army Aviation, (May 1996), 5

⁸³ House, 95

⁸⁴ JCS, Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, (Army: US Army AG Publication Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2898); January, 1995 III-2

⁸⁵ John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, (April 1992), 26,27

⁸⁶ JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, V-3

⁸⁷ FM 100-5 Operations, 3-3

⁸⁸ Ibid., 3-3

⁸⁹ FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations, 5-18

⁹⁰ Ibid., 2-11, 12. Note: FM 100-20 recommends the use of maneuver and direct firepower to minimize collateral damage. Shows of force “involves the mere appearance of a combat-ready force in the vicinity of a potential enemy...” Demonstrations display firepower and maneuver through the exhibition of aerial flights, airborne, air assaults, firepower exercises or amphibious exercises where they can be observed by potential enemies.

⁹¹ House, 90

⁹² Ibid., 90

⁹³ Major David J. Schroer, Introduction to Low Intensity Conflict, Bulletin Number 90-4 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1990), http://call.army.mil:1100/call/.ctc_bull/90-4toc.htm

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Joint Pub 1, A-2

⁹⁶ Joint Pub 3-0, II-2

⁹⁷ Ibid., IV-5, VI-8 and VII-11

⁹⁸ Ibid., VI-3, and VI-9

⁹⁹ Ibid., VI-9

¹⁰⁰ JCS, Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Headquarters Department of the Army, Headquarters TRADOC), October, 1992; II-15

¹⁰¹ JCS, Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Headquarters Department of the Army, Headquarters TRADOC), June, 1995; ix

¹⁰² Ibid., IV-4

¹⁰³ Fm 100-5 Operations, 2-2

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 3-6

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 5-2

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 5-5

¹⁰⁷ Department of the Army, FM 100-15 Corps Operations (Headquarters, TRADOC, June, 1996): 9-9

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 9-10

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